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No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, but a valid decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction or agreement
approved by decree of said court for the
support of a spouse .. . shall not consti·
tute a debt within the meaning of this
section.
Md. Const. art III, § 38 (emphasis added).
The aforementioned section of the code
also states that contractual spousal support
is subject to modification unless the parties
provide otherwise. Mendelson at 497, 541
A.2d at 1336.
With recognition of the plain language
of the statutes, the court determined that
[d]espite the amended language of article III, § 8-103(b) of the Family Law
Code, unless the separation agreement
is made part of the divorce decree, it
cannot be enforced by imprisonment
for contempt. There being no order to
pay the support, failure to ptry would
merely be a breach of contract and not
contemptuous disobedience of a court
order.

Mendelson at 497-98, 541 A.2d at 1337 (emphasis added). The court concluded that
the separation agreement was separate
from the decree of divorce despite the clear
language of th.e statute. There was therefore no basis from which to modify the
agreement. Id.
The Mendelson court then examined the
case law regarding non-merger clauses and
the attendant beliefs held by members of
the legal community resulting therefrom.
The court recognized that prior to 1983 it
was commonplace for attorneys to insert
non-merger clauses in separation agreements. Judge Bloom then cited two cases
which discussed the effect of non-merger
clauses, Id. at 1337 (citing Johnston v.
Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983);
Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99, 465 A.2d
445 (1983», and reasoned that:
[i]t was apparently believed that incorporation would make the agreement
part of the decree while non-merger
would preserve its contractual status.
Thus, in the event of a breach, it was
thought, the aggrieved party would
have the choice of enforcing the decree
or suing on the contract. Since such
language is still being inserted in sep~
ration agreements, we suspect that
Johnston has been ignored or misread.

Id. at 495,541 A.2d 1336 (emphasis added).
Mendelson relied primarily on the rationale of Johnston, which concerned the question of whether a separation agreement

incorporated but not merged into a
divorce decree was subject to collateral
attack. Johnston explained the difference
between the terms "incorporation" and
"merger." Whereas "incorporation" is the
mere identification and approval of the
validity of a separation agreement,
"merger" is a substitution of rights and
duties.Id. at 498, 541 A.2d 1337. The separation agreement is said to be superseded
by the decree when the agreement is
merged into the decree, and when the
agreement fails to indicate whether it
should be merged. As such, the agreement
would be enforceable through contempt
proceedings. Alternatively, if the separ~
tion agreement contains a non-merger
clause, the agreement is not superseded by
the decree and retains its "life" as a contract. But, because the agreement is a contract, it is not enforceable through
contempt proceedings. In applying
Johnston to the facts in Mendelson, the
court held that since the separation and
property settlement agreement was not
made part of the decree, the agreement
remained separate from the decree and
thus could not be enforced through contempt proceedings. Id. at 499, 541 A.2d
1338.
The court then turned its attention to
the question of whether the separation
agreement sub judice could be modified or
terminated by the court. By the terms of
the agreement, modification of spousal
support could take place only upon appellant's disability or retirement at age 60 or
thereafter. Since the separation agreement
was not merged, the agreement and not the
decree dictated the conditions under
which modification could be compelled.
Due to the rule foreclosing collateral
attack on agreements approved by a court
of competent jurisdiction, "[t]he circuit
court that issued that decree lost its continuing jurisdiction over it and thus any
power to modify it when the decree
became enrolled." Id. at 500, 541 A.2d
1338.
The court held that the separation agreement was unambiguous regarding the
terms under which spousal support could
be terminated. The conditions precedent
to the termination of spousal support were
remarriage of appellee, or the death of
either party. Since neither event occured,
the court held that the termination provisions had not been activated. Id.
The holding in Mendelson v. Mendelson
will affect many areas of domestic practice
in Maryland. Those who entered into sep~
ration agreements with non-merger clauses
might refuse to pay spousal and perhaps
even child support-the only recourse

being an action for breach of contract.
Cases concerning these and similar issues
will undoubtedly lead to a review of
Mendelson by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
In
subsequent
actions.
Mendelson may be attacked as inconsistent
with the intent of Johnston, Hamilos, the
Family Law Article and the Maryland
Constitution. Additionally, since the issue
of non-merger clauses was clearly not the
subject of appellant's action, the court's
analysis regarding non-merger clauses may
be considered dicta and given less weight.
Finally, there lies the question of the
potential liability of attorneys who
inserted non-merger clauses in separation
agreements, erroneously assuring clients
that, in the event of breach, an action
either for breach or contempt of court
could be maintained.

- Jules R. Brickel

Coy v. Iowa: PLACING SCREEN
BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL
VIOIA TES 1HE RIGHT TO FACETO-FACE CONFRONTATION
In Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. ~ 108 S.
Ct. 2798 (1988), the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a plurality opinion, held
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a defendant the right to literal
face-to-face confrontation with the
witnesses against him. The plurality arrived at its decision by emphasizing that a
fair trial requires face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the accuser
in a criminal prosecution.
In August of 1985, the appellant, John
Avery Coy, was charged with sexually
assaulting two minor girls while they were
camping out in the backyard of the house
next door to his. The girls claimed that
Coy came into their tent, with a stocking
over his head, while they were sleeping.
Coy shined a flashlight in their eyes and
told them not to look at him. Consequently, the girls could not identify his face.
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The plurality felt that there may be
Ct. at 2801. The plurality in Coy agreed,
At the beginning of the trial, the proseexplicit exceptions to the right to face-toholding that the Confrontation Clause
cution moved, pursuant to Iowa Code
face confrontation, though the exceptions
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face
Ann. § 910.A14 (West 1987), to allow the
would only exist in the furtherance of
encounter with the witnesses in front of
complaining witnesses to testify either by
important public policy. Coy. __ U.S. at
the trier of fact. Id. at 2800. A fact can only
closed circuit T.V. or behind a screen. The
statute was enacted in an effort to make
- > 108 S. Ct. at 2803. Expanding on
be proved against a defendant by witnesses
child witnesses more comfortable while
this, the Court noted that the exception
who confront the defendant at trial. Id.
giving testimony. The trial court allowed a
must be something "firmly ... rooted in
(citing Kirby '0. United States, 174 U.S. 47,
large screen to separate the appellant from
our jurisprudence." Id. (quoting Bourjaily
55 (1899».
the witnesses during their testimony. By
'0. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (citing
Aside from precedent, the plurality also
adjusting the lighting in the courtroom,
used numerous references to, and
Dutton '0. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970»). The
the appellant was barely able to see the
plurality felt that the criterion of being
quotations from, antiquity to elaborate on
witnesses and they were not able to see
"firmly rooted" was not met in this case
the proposition that to have a fair criminal
him at all.
since the Iowa legislature only made a gentrial, human nature dictates the necessity
Coy objected vehemently to the use of
eralized finding of necessity to allow the
of face-to-face confrontation between the
the screen on two theories. First, he
accused and the accuser. Coy, __ U.S. at
screen to be used. There were no findings
claimed that the sixth amendment gives
_______ 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (citing Pointer '0.
that the specific witnesses in this case needcriminal defendants the right to literal
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965».
ed to be protected by the screen. Id.
face-to-face confrontation regardless of
Confrontation has continued over time
As a final point, the plurality said that it
whether the complaining witness is
because a witness will feel differently when
was not necessary to discuss Coy's due
uncomfortable while giving testimony.
process argument since his right to face-toconfronted with the defendant whom he
Second, Coy claimed that his due process
could harm with his testimony. Coy, __
face confrontation was violated.
right was violated since the screen would
U.S. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. The
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
make him appear guilty even though the
White, wrote a concurring opinion agreeplurality noted that "[i]t is always more
jury was instructed not to infer a
ing with the plurality that Coy's right to
difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his
presumption of guilt.
face' than 'behind his back.'" Id. If the
confrontation was violated in this case. Id.
The trial court rejected Coy's
witness does lie, his testimony is not as
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She wrote
constitutional objections and simply
convincing when he is confronted by the
separately to express that an appropriate
instructed the jury not to draw an
defendant
he
is
accusing.
Id.
case could provide the necessary interests
inference of guilt from the screen. Coy
The plurality recognized that while a
was found guilty of two counts of
witness might be upset by the face-to-face
lascivious acts with a child. On appeal, the
confrontation, the confrontation is likely
Supreme Court of Iowa rejected Coy's
to undo the false accuser. Consequently,
constitutional arguments and affirmed the
when the sides are weighed, the
result of the trial court. Coy '0. State, 397
constitutional protection of a right to
N.W.2d 730 (1986). The Iowa Supreme
literal
face-to-face
confrontation
Court found that Coy's right to
outweighs the uneasiness the witness may
confrontation was not violated since his
experience by the confr.ontation. Id.
ability to cross-examine the witnesses was
Applying these principles to Coy, the
not disturbed. The court also found that
plurality concluded that the screen used at
the screen was not unfairly prejudicial to
Coy's trial was an obvious violation of his
Coy.ld.
right to confront the witnesses since it
Coy appealed to the United States
prevented the witnesses from viewing
Supreme Court. With Justice Scalia
Coy.ld. Thus, the right to confrontation
writing for the plurality, the Court
includes literal face-to-face confrontation
reversed the Iowa Supreme Court holding
along with the opportunity to crossthat a criminal defendant has a right to
examine. The State of Iowa argued that the
literal face-to-face confrontation of
One sentence inserted by
right to confrontation was outweighed by
complaining witnesses. The plurality
your attorneythe need to protect the two victims of sex
traced the right to confrontation to the
"I give and bequeath to the
abuse. The plurality disagreed with this
beginnings of Western legal traditions,
American Lung Alloclaargument when applying it to the facts of
tlon of Maryland the lum
Roman law and early English law. Coy,
0'
dollarl to be
this case and the statute involved;
__ U.S. at _______ 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing
u.ed for It. general
however,
they
did
indicate
that
the
right
California 'O.Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174
purpo.e....
to confrontation is not absolute. Id. There
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
-can help prevent and care for
are certain interests that may outweigh
Harlan felt that the right to confrontation
lung diseases that cripple and
rights which are implicit in the
kill adults and children.
"'[s]imply as a matter of English' .. ,
confrontation clause, namely, the right to
confers at least 'a right to meet face to face
cross examine the witness, see Chambers '0.
all those who appear and give evidence at
AMERICAN
J,lississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); the
trial.'" California '0. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
WNG
right to exclude hearsay, see Ohio '0.
175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
• ASSOCIATION
Roberts,
448
U.S.
56,
63-65
(1980);
and
the
In Green, the Court "described the
0/ Maryla"d, I"t:.
ISOI "ark Rood. Lu.horvm •. MD 2109!1
right to face-to-face confrontation with the
'literal right to 'confront' the witness at
witness at some time during the
the time of trial' as forming 'the core of
proceedings other than at trial. Kentucky '0.
the values furthered by the Confrontation
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
Clause.'" Coy, __ U.S. at _______ 108 S.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 19.2/ The Law Forum-35
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to allow the use of some device to protect
the witness from viewing the defendant. In
such a case, the interest would outweigh
the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation.
The interest to protect child witnesses
from literal face-to-face confrontation
would be a proper compelling interest to
allow something other than direct face-toface confrontation. Id. Justice O'Connor
continued noting that the confrontation
clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial .... " Id. Furthermore, the Coy decision should not be read
to discourage state legislatures from protecting child witnesses. Even if certain legislation is judged to run contrary to the
confrontation clause, it might fall within
an exception and thus the protection
device may be used.
In a bitter dissent, Justice Blackrnun,
joined by the Chief Justice, felt that neither Coy's right to confrontation nor his
due process right was violated.The dissent
believed that the right to confrontation
gives the defendant a "right to be shown
that the accuser is real and the right to
probe [the] accuser and [his] accusation in
front of the trier of fact." Id. (Blackrnun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackrnun believed
that these criteria were met in Coy's case.
He noted that Coy could see the girls
through the screen, the girls could see the
judge, jury and counsel, and they could see
the girls, the jury could see Coy while the
girls testified, and the girls were told that
Coy could see and hear them while they
testified. Id. at 2806. The dissent argued
that Coy's objection that the girls could
not see him while they testified was too
narrow. Justice Blackrnun felt that the
plurality's holding that the witness must
have the ability to see the defendant will
put a roadblock in front of state legislatures trying to protect child witnesses.
Justice Blackrnun also felt that the confrontation clause has as its essential purpose the right of cross-examination. Id. at
2808. This was based on Dean Wigmore's
statement that "[t]here never was at common law any recognized right to an
indispensable thing called confrontation as
distinguished from cross·examination." 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, 158 O. Chadbourn rev. 1974}. This principle is supported by the fact that many hearsay
statements may be admitted at trial even
though the defendant does not get to confront the person who made the hearsay
statement. Coy, __ U.S. at - > 108 S.
Ct. at 2809. As a further explanation of
this point, Justice Blackrnun gave an example of a blind person who could not see the
defendant. With a blind person, however,
the defendant could not make the same

objection that Coy did. Therefore, Justice
Blackrnun felt that the right to crossexamine a witness was the essential part of
the confrontation clause.
Justice Blackrnun believed that the protection of children was an extremely
important public interest to protect. Recognizing this, he felt that the use of the
screen outweighed Coy's right to face-toface confrontation with the girls.
Finally, Justice Blackrnun concluded
that the screen did not unduly prejudice
Coy such that his due process was violated. He noted that a screen does not imply guilt as do other things like shackles.
Id. at 2810. Furthermore, the jury was
given an instruction which told them
explicitly not to draw any inferences of
guilt from the screen. Justice Blackrnun
felt this was sufficient to overcome Coy's
due process argument. Id.
The plurality in Coy concluded that a
defendant in a criminal trial has the right
to literal face-to-face confrontation of the
witnesses against him except in certain situations. These situations arise when there
is a strong public policy interest which
outweighs the right to confrontation. The
Coy Court concluded that when a legislature enacts a statute based on general findings, it will not be enough to show a public
interest that outweighs the right to confrontation. It should be noted, however,
that Justice Kennedy did not participate in
this decision in any way.

- Richard ],f. Goldberg

Austin v. Thrifty Diversified:
EMPLOYER'S liABILITY
EXPANDED WHILE EMPLOYEE
ON EMPLOYER'S PREMISES
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in Austin v. Thrifty Diversified,
76 Md. App. 150, 543 A.2d 889 (1988),
rejected a wrongful death claim, but found
that an employee who was injured after
normal working hours while using his
employer's equipment, on the employer's
premises, and with the employer's permission, was covered instead under the exclusive
remedy
of
the
Worker's
Compensation Act. The court agreed with
the trial court that the employee's death
arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
Thrifty Diversified hired John Douglas
Austin to work as a certified welder. On
the day of the accident he received permission to use the company's arc welding

machine to repair the exhaust system on a
friend's automobile. Austin was to perform the repairs on the employer's
premises after his regular shift ended.
While using the arc welding machine to
make the repairs, Austin was electrocuted.
Austin's parents instituted a wrongful
death action. The employer moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that
the exclusive remedy was under the
Worker's Compensation Act ("the Act").
The Act lists the duties that employers
owe to their employees. It provides, in
pertinent part, that:
[e]very employer subject to the provisions of this article, shall payor provide as required herein compensation
according to the schedules of this article for the disability or death of his
employee resulting from an accidental
personal injury sustained by the
employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment without
regard to fault as a cause of such
injury ....
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, §15 (1957).
Therefore, the question addressed was
whether this accident arose out of and in
the course of the decendent's employment.
In answering this question, the court
first looked at the causal connection
between the injury and the employment.
The court reasoned that but for his
employment, Austin's death would not
have ensued. Because he was an employee
of Thrifty, Austin was allowed to use the
company's arc welder for a personal project on their premises. "Moreover, the
instrumentality of the death, the place
where it happened, and the activity giving
rise to it were the same as those he [Austin]
encountered in his employment;" 76 Md.
App. at 159, 543 A.2d at 894. The court
concluded that the accident arose out of
the deceased's employment.
The difficulty facing the court, however,
was the question of "in the course of
employment." Section 15 of the Worker's
Compensation Act requires both "arising
out of' and "in the course of employment." It is not an either/or test. Both factors must be present in order to apply the
exclusive remedy of the Act.
To determine if the activity meets the
"in the course of employment" test, it
must be shown that the activity is sufficiently work-related to be an incident of
employment. An activity is an incident of
employment if "the employer expects or
receives substantial benefit" from his
employees participating in that activity.
Md. App. at 160, 543 A.2d at 894.
The court found that compensation ben-
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